|Deregulation in Practice
- The push to deregulate is prompted by two concerns:
- The dynamic inefficiencies that regulation imposes. These
inefficiencies accumulate over time making the regulated industry less productive
- Advancing technology destroys the basis for natural monopoly.
- The railroad industry is an example of natural monopoly with high fixed costs and negligible marginal costs.
- The Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) was created in 1887
to limit monopolistic exploitation of the railroad situation while assuring
a “fair” profit to railroad owners.
- With the advent of buses, trucks, subways, airplanes and pipelines
as alternative modes of transportation, railroad regulation became increasingly
- The Railroad Revitalization and Regulatory Reform Act of 1976,
followed by the Staggers Rail Act of 1980, granted railroads much greater
freedom to adapt their prices and service to market demands.
- Railroad companies used that flexibility to increase their share of total freight traffic.
- The railroads prospered under deregulation by reconfiguring
routes and services, cutting operating costs, and offering lower rates.
Between 1986 and 1993, the average cost of moving freight by rail dropped
by 69 percent.
- Not all rates fell, however. After a series of mergers
and acquisitions the top four railroads moved nearly 90 percent of all rail
freight in 1998-99. Some firms held monopoly positions on specific
routs. Shippers in these ‘captive’ markets were paying rates 20-30
percent higher than in non-monopoly routes.
- In the 1930s, Congress broadened the powers of the ICC to regulate
interstate trucking to protect the industry from the effects of the Great
- As a result, the industry flourished with its regulation-protected
profits. It became so profitable that people were willing to pay $500,000
for a trucking license.
- Entry regulations were relaxed in 1978 and major reforms were
instituted by 1979. Between 1980 and 1992, the number of firms increased
from 18,000 to over 48,000. By 1981, the value of existing truck licenses
had fallen to $13,000.
- Technology outpaced regulation and greatly reduced the cost for new firms to provide long-distance service.
- Long Distance
- In 1982, the courts put an end to AT&T’s monopoly.
- Since then, over 800 firms have entered the industry, and long-distance telephone rates have dropped sharply.
- Between 1983 and 1990, long-distance telephone rates fell more than 40 percent.
- The quality of service has also been improved with fiber-optic
cable, advanced switching systems, cell phones, and myriad new phone-lines
- Long-distance telephone use in the United States has tripled.
- As long distance services increased, the monopoly nature of local rates became painfully apparent.
- Local rates kept increasing after 1983 while long-distance rates were tumbling.
- New technologies permitted “wireless” companies to offer local service if they could gain access to the monopoly networks.
- Congress passed the Telecommunications Act of 1996 requiring
the Baby Bells to grant rivals access to their transmission networks.
- Potential rivals accuse the Baby Bells of foot dragging by
charging excessive access fees, imposing overly complex access codes, requiring
unnecessary capital equipment, and raising other entry barriers.
- Four years after the mandate the “open access” the Baby Bells still held near monopoly positions in local telephone service.
- The Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB) was created in 1938 to regulate airline routes and fares.
No Price Competition
- The primary objective was to ensure a viable system of air
transportation for both large and small communities. The focus of the
CAB was on profit regulation.
- A secondary objective was to ensure air service to smaller,
less-traveled communities. Short hauls entail higher average costs
and, therefore, higher fares. Cross-subsidization was used in the regulation
of the industry to keep local rates low.
- By fixing airfares, the CAB eliminated price competition between established carriers.
- The CAB eliminated price competition between established carriers.
- The absence of new entrants and price competition kept interstate airfares high.
- Using intrastate airlines, which are not regulated by the
ICC, studies showed that regulated interstate fares were as much as 60 percent
higher than those on comparable intrastate routes.
- Despite the high regulated fares, established carriers were
unable to reap much profit. Unable to compete on the basis of price,
the established carriers had to engage in nonprice competition through product
differentiation (advertising, more frequent flights, first-run moves, free
- The profit regulation came to be regarded as a failure since
the airlines were not making substantial profits and consumers were not being
offered very many price-service combinations.
- The Airline Deregulation Act of 1978 changed the structure and behavior of the airline industry.
- This act eliminated the regulatory barrier to entry.
- Between 1978 and 1985, the number of airline companies increased from 37 to 174.
- The share of domestic markets with four or more carriers grew from 13 percent in May 1978 to 73 percent in May 1981.
- Price competition reduce average fares as much as 40 percent below regulated levels.
- There were some unforeseen positive externalities associated
with the airline industry deregulation. In addition to the 40% average
drop in airline fares, the increased use of air travel led to fewer auto
accidents and fatalities as well as better air traffic control.
- To exploit their hub dominance, major carriers must keep rivals out.
- One of the most effective entry barriers is their ownership of landing “slots”.
- In 1998 United Airlines controlled 82 percent of the slots at Chicago’s O’Hare, up from 66 percent in 1986.
- Delta controls 83 percent of the slots at New York’s Kennedy airport.
- Smaller airlines complain that they can’t get access to these slots, even when they are not being used.
- Critics argue that despite the increasing industry concentration,
there is more competition in most airline markets. They argue the airline
industry is a contestable market.
- The cable TV industry has gone through both deregulation and re-regulation.
- Initially a regulated industry, Congress was convinced by 1984
that broadcast TV and related technologies offered sufficient competition
to ensure consumers fair prices and quality service. The Cable Communications
Policy Act of 1984 deregulated the industry.
- After a period of rapid price growth, the industry was re-regulated in 1992.
- Cable operators claim that with the emergence of new and competing
technologies (e.g. satellite subscription services), regulation is not necessary.
They claim that the lost revenue will keep them from desired upgrades.
- Congress responded to these industry complaints by deregulating
the cable industry again. The Telecommunications Turns Act of 1996
mandated that rate regulation be phased out and ended completely by March
- Cable prices soared again. In 1997-98, cable rates rose four times faster than inflation.
- As the deadline for rate regulation approached, Congress was
contemplating re-regulating the industry. Critics asserted that alternative
technologies were still not viable competitors to the cable monopolies.
- The electric utility industry is the latest target for deregulation.
- New high-voltage transmission lines can carry power thousands of miles with negligible power loss.
- There is no longer a need to rely on a regional utility monopoly.
- At the wholesale level, utility companies have been trading
electricity across state lines since 1992. Now they are under pressure
to allow retail competition as well.
- As in the telephone industry, the local utilities are being forced to grant rival power companies access to their wires.
- Norway deregulated its electric industry in 1991 and prices soon declined by 20 percent.
- In 1998, California opened its transmission networks to competition
and 200 companies, from as far away as Atlanta, registered to supply power.